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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
1
issued eight trademark decisions and designated one of those eight
2
decisions as precedential. These numbers are significantly lower
3
The cases consist of appeals from the
than in recent years.
4
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), the United States
5
Court of International Trade, and the United States Court of Federal
6
Claims.
Of the eight trademark decisions, four focused on substantive
7
8
issues and four primarily involved procedural issues. The Federal
Circuit generally adopted the findings of the lower tribunals,
9
affirming all but one of the eight decisions on appeal.
The majority of the decisions were resolved based on longstanding
10
precedent. A few of the cases, however, addressed issues of first
1. Hainline v. Vanity Fair, Inc., No. 2008-1313, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (per curiam); Farah v. Pramil S.R.L., No. 2008-1329, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 24184 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 24, 2008) (per curiam); Siler v. United States,
No. 2008-5054, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2008) (per curiam),
aff’g No. 08-099C, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 337 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 6, 2008); First Niagara
Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 294 F. App’x 609 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(per curiam), aff’g Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193, 91122450, 91122712,
911502371 (T.T.A.B. June 6, 2007); In re Marisol, LLC, 281 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (per curiam); Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., 522 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2008), aff’g No. 92045050, 2007 WL 1022715 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2007); Sakar Int’l,
Inc. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008); In
re Centocor, Inc., 267 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
2. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d 1340.
3. By comparison, the Federal Circuit issued fifteen decisions in 2007 (eight of
which were precedential), ten decisions in 2006 (seven of which were precedential),
and twelve decisions in 2005 (six of which were precedential). See Stephen R. Baird,
2005 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1263 (2006); Christine
Haight Farley, Review of the 2006 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 987 (2007); Susan M. Kayser & David Jaquette, 2007 Trademark Law Decisions of
the Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1039 (2008).
4. Hainline, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558, at *1; Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
24184, at *1; First Niagara, 294 F. App’x at 610; In re Marisol, 281 F. App’x at 999;
Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d at 1320; In re Centocor, 267 F. App’x at 931.
5. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1340.
6. Siler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *1.
7. Hainline, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558 (likelihood of confusion); First
Niagara, 294 F. App’x 609 (priority and likelihood of confusion); In re Marisol, 281 F.
App’x 999 (likelihood of confusion); In re Centocor, 267 F. App’x 931 (mere
descriptiveness).
8. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *1–3 (standing and collateral
estoppel); Siler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *1 (jurisdiction); Nasalok Coating
Corp., 522 F.3d at 1322 (res judicata); Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1341–42
(jurisdiction).
9. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1341–42 (reversing the decision of the Court of
International Trade).
10. See, e.g., Hainline, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558, at *3–8 (applying the
traditional In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. likelihood-of-confusion factors); In re
Marisol, 281 F. App’x at 999 (same).
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impression for the court. In Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., for
example, the Federal Circuit held that a claim for cancellation of a
trademark registration is not a compulsory counterclaim for a party
13
defending an infringement action in federal court. Significantly,
TTAB procedure provides that such a counterclaim is compulsory in
14
TTAB proceedings under the same circumstances. Thus, whether a
party has waived its right to challenge a trademark registration after
failing to seek cancellation of that registration in a prior proceeding
will turn on whether that proceeding was a federal court case or a
15
proceeding before the TTAB.
16
Also of note, in Sakar International, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade’s finding that it had
jurisdiction to consider a party’s challenge to a fine issued by the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection for importing counterfeit
17
The Federal Circuit found that the restrictions on
products.
importing counterfeit products did not rise to the level of an
“embargo,” and thus the challenge to the fines was not within the
18
limited jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.
Each of the Federal Circuit’s 2008 trademark decisions is discussed
in detail below.

11. See, e.g., Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d 1320 (clarifying when a counterclaim
is compulsory in actions for federal trademark infringement); Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516
F.3d 1340 (clarifying that jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade does not
extend to challenges to fines issued by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
based on the importation of counterfeit goods).
12. 522 F.3d 1320.
13. Id. at 1326.
14. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TMBP) § 313.01 (2003) (“‘A defense attacking the validity of
any one or more of the registrations pleaded in the petition shall be a compulsory
counterclaim if grounds for such counterclaim exist at the time when the answer is
filed.’” (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 2.114(b)(2)(i))); see also Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d
at 1325 n.3 (reminding that TTAB rules do not apply to infringement actions
brought in federal district court).
15. Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d at 1325.
16. 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008).
17. Id. at 1350.
18. Id. at 1346–48.
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SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Likelihood of Confusion
19

Hainline v. Vanity Fair, Inc.
In Hainline, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision
sustaining the oppositions of Vanity Fair, Inc. (“Vanity Fair”), owner
of several VANITY FAIR marks for clothing products, against Kelly C.
Hainline’s applications for the marks VANITY N SANITY, VANITY &
SANITY, and VANITY INSANITY (the “VANITY INSANITY marks”)
20
for clothing products.
Hainline sought registration of the VANITY INSANITY marks for a
variety of clothing products, including lingerie, loungewear,
21
sleepwear, and underwear.
Vanity Fair alleged prior use and
registration of several VANITY FAIR marks for similar clothing
products and filed oppositions against each of Hainline’s applications
on the ground of likelihood of confusion under section 2(d) of the
22
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
In evaluating Vanity Fair’s claims, the TTAB applied the traditional
likelihood-of-confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours
23
& Co.
Regarding the fame of the prior mark, the fifth DuPont
1.

19. No. 2008-1313, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (per
curiam).
20. Id. at *1–2.
21. Vanity Fair, Inc. v. Hainline (Hainline TTAB Decision), Nos. 91163354,
91166973, 91166975, 2008 WL 853839, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d, No. 20081313, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (per curiam).
22. Id. Vanity Fair also opposed the applications on the ground of dilution, but
that claim was deemed waived because Vanity Fair did not brief the issue before the
Board. Id. at *1 n.4.
23. Id. at *3; see In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A.
1973). Under DuPont, the TTAB considers the following factors, among others, in
determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. (2) The
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in
use. (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels. (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. (5) The fame of
the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use). (6) The number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. (7) The nature and extent
of any actual confusion. (8) The length of time during and conditions
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion. (9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house
mark, “family” mark, product mark). (10) The market interface between
applicant and the owner of a prior mark . . . . (11) The extent to which
applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods.
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factor, the TTAB found that the VANITY FAIR mark had achieved a
significant degree of fame based on Vanity Fair’s use of the mark on
24
clothing since 1916 and its substantial sales and advertising figures.
The TTAB also found that DuPont factors two, three, and four favored
Vanity Fair because some of the parties’ goods were legally identical,
the parties’ trade channels were presumed identical, and the parties’
goods were ordinary consumer goods purchased by ordinary
consumers who would exercise only a normal degree of care in
25
Additionally, the TTAB found that the
purchasing the goods.
parties’ marks were similar in overall connotation because VANITY
was distinctive as to clothing and was thus the dominant element of
the parties’ marks, and also VANITY was the first word in the parties’
26
marks.
27
The TTAB found that factors six, seven, and eight were neutral. It
explained that the strength of the VANITY FAIR mark was not
28
mitigated by third-party use of similar marks for similar goods.
Specifically, although Hainline had submitted evidence of certain
third-party registrations for the VANITY FAIR mark, these
registrations did not constitute evidence of third-party use of the
VANITY FAIR mark and none of the registrations covered the goods
29
at issue (i.e., clothing). With respect to actual confusion, the TTAB
noted that because Hainline’s applications were based on “intent-touse,” there was no evidence that she had made significant use of the
30
VANITY INSANITY marks. And because there had not been an
opportunity for actual confusion to occur, the lack of actual
31
confusion was not probative.
On balance, the TTAB found that the DuPont factors weighed in
32
favor of a likelihood of confusion.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Hainline first argued that
significant differences existed between the VANITY INSANITY marks
and the VANITY FAIR mark because Hainline’s marks had “more
visual presence and persistence” and were “more visually cutting edge

(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or
substantial. (13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
476 F.2d at 1361.
24. Hainline TTAB Decision, 2008 WL 853839 at *3.
25. Id. at *4.
26. See id. at *5.
27. Id. at *4–5.
28. Id. at *4.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *5.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *6.
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33

and progressive.” The Federal Circuit, however, agreed with the
TTAB that the parties’ marks were similar in overall connotation
because VANITY was the dominant feature of the parties’ marks and
34
VANITY was distinctive and thus strong as applied to clothing.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Hainline’s challenge to the
35
TTAB’s determination that the VANITY FAIR mark was famous.
Hainline argued that Vanity Fair did not prove fame because it had
not provided direct evidence of market share, surveys, or consumer
36
recognition of the mark’s fame. The Federal Circuit explained that
there was no requirement that Vanity Fair submit direct evidence of
fame because the fame of a mark may be measured indirectly by the
sales volume and advertising expenditures. Here, Vanity Fair had
37
provided this type of evidence.
Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed Hainline’s argument that the
TTAB erred by not considering third-party registrations for the mark
38
VANITY FAIR. The court explained that the TTAB had considered
the third-party registrations, but the registrations did not cover
clothing and Hainline did not establish use of the marks covered by
39
the third-party registrations. Therefore, the court explained, the
40
third-party registrations were of minimal probative value.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision sustaining Vanity
Fair’s oppositions to registration of Hainline’s VANITY INSANITY
41
marks.
42

In re Marisol, LLC
In In re Marisol, the Federal Circuit affirmed, without opinion, the
TTAB’s decision, affirming the examining attorney’s final refusal to
register Marisol, LLC’s (“Applicant”) mark, DON THE
BEACHCOMBER, as a trademark for “alcoholic beverages, namely,
rum,” on the ground that the mark was confusingly similar to the
previously registered BEACHCOMBER mark for “alcoholic
43
beverages, namely, flavored rum.”

2.

33. Hainline v. Vanity Fair, Inc., No. 2008-1313, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558, at
*8 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (per curiam).
34. Id. at *9.
35. Id. at *10.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *10–11.
39. Id. at *11.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 281 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g No. 76600374, 2007 WL
2698285 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2007).
43. Id. at 1000.
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In weighing the DuPont likelihood-of-confusion factors, the TTAB
first found that the factors of similarity of goods, trade channels and
45
conditions of sale favored a finding of likelihood of confusion. The
TTAB explained that the relevant goods were legally identical
because Applicant’s goods (rum) encompassed Registrant’s goods
46
(flavored rum). The TTAB also found that because the goods were
the same, they were presumed to be sold in the same channels of
47
trade to the same classes of customers.
Further, the TTAB
determined that some of those consumers would not be “particularly
48
sophisticated or knowledgeable about rum.”
Next, the TTAB found that two additional factors—fame and the
extent of third-party use of the mark for similar goods—also weighed
49
in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
Although there was no
evidence of fame of the BEACHCOMBER mark, the TTAB found
that it was an arbitrary mark and was thus entitled to a broader scope
50
of protection than if it were a highly suggestive mark. Additionally,
the TTAB noted that there was no evidence of third-party use of
51
BEACHCOMBER marks.
Regarding the similarity of the parties’ marks, the TTAB rejected
Applicant’s argument that either the term DON or DON THE was
52
the dominant part of its DON THE BEACHCOMBER mark. Rather,
the TTAB found that the term DON was not “entitled to greater
weight than BEACHCOMBER, since THE BEACHCOMBER [was] so
53
intrinsically related to DON as an identifier of who DON is.” The
TTAB also disagreed with the examining attorney’s position that
54
BEACHCOMBER was the dominant part of Applicant’s mark. The
TTAB reasoned that the impression created by Applicant’s mark was
the phrase DON THE BEACHCOMBER and, thus, both the name
55
DON and the word BEACHCOMBER had to be given weight.
Applying this analysis, the TTAB held that the similarities far
56
outweighed the dissimilarities between the marks.
The TTAB
44. See supra note 23 (listing the DuPont factors).
45. In re Marisol, LLC (Marisol TTAB Decision), No. 76600374, 2007 WL 2698285
(T.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2007), aff’d, 281 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
46. Id. at *2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *2–3.
49. Id. at *3.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *5–13.
53. Id. at *13.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *17.
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explained that the word BEACHCOMBER was identical in both
marks, BEACHCOMBER was an arbitrary term for rum, there was no
evidence of third-party registrations or third-party use of the marks
comprising of or containing the BEACHCOMBER term, and
Applicant’s DON THE BEACHCOMBER mark did not convey a
significantly different meaning or commercial impression than
57
Registrant’s BEACHCOMBER mark.
On balance, the TTAB found that there was a likelihood of
confusion between the marks and affirmed the decision of the
58
examining attorney.
The Federal Circuit, in turn, affirmed the
59
decision of the TTAB.
B. Mere Descriptiveness
60

In re Centocor, Inc.
In In re Centocor, the Federal Circuit affirmed, without opinion, the
TTAB’s decision that Centocor, Inc.’s mark, PROGRAMMED
PROTEIN, was merely descriptive of its medical research services
relating to DNA and gene synthesis and was thus barred from
registration under section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
61
§ 1052(e)(1).
Centocor filed an application to register PROGRAMMED
PROTEIN for “medical research services relating to DNA and gene
62
synthesis.”
The examining attorney refused registration under
section 2(e)(1) on the ground that Applicant’s mark was merely
63
descriptive of its services.
On appeal to the TTAB, the examining attorney relied on the
following dictionary definition for the word “programmed” in
support of her decision: “3.(c)(1) to code in an organism’s program
(2) to provide with a biological program, <cells programmed to
synthesize hemoglobin>; 4. to predetermine the thinking, behavior,
64
or operations of as if by computer programming.” The examining
1.

57. Id. at *7.
58. Id. at *21–22.
59. In re Marisol, LLC, 281 F. App’x 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g
No. 76600374, 2007 WL 2698285 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2007).
60. 267 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g No. 78448489, 2006 WL
3540106, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2006).
61. Id. at 932.
62. In re Centocor, Inc. (Centocor TTAB Decision), No. 78448489, 2006 WL
3540106, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2006), aff’d, 267 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
63. Id. at *1.
64. Id. at *2 (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/programmed (last visited Jan. 31, 2009)).
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attorney also submitted printouts from websites, as well as excerpted
articles from various publications, where the phrase “programmed
protein” or the words “programmed” and “protein” were used by
65
third parties in medical contexts.
Among other evidence, Centocor submitted a business plan
describing its anticipated services under the PROGRAMMED
PROTEIN mark, a hit list of excerpted articles from the GOOGLE
search engine, and search results from the websites of the “Top 10
Pharmaceutical companies” and from the “On-Line Medical
66
Dictionary.”
In addition, Centocor submitted the following
dictionary definition regarding the word “protein”: “1. any of
numerous naturally occurring extremely complex substances that
consist of amino acid residues joined by peptide bonds, contain the
elements carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, usually sulfur, and
occasionally other elements . . . and include many essential biological
67
compounds.”
Based on a review of Centocor’s business plan, the TTAB noted
that Centocor’s services would involve the design and development of
protein pharmaceuticals and that the proteins were produced “by
programming the sequence into the synthetic DNA and expressing it
68
Accordingly, the TTAB found that “protein” was
in host cells.”
descriptive of Centocor’s services because it was the resulting product
of the services, and that “programmed” was similarly descriptive
69
because it was the means by which the services create the product.
Additionally, the TTAB found that these terms together did not
70
create a “unique or incongruous combination.” Rather, the TTAB
concluded that, when combined, these terms did not lose their
descriptive significance but, in fact, made clear that Centocor
71
intended to produce programmed protein.
In finding the PROGRAMMED PROTEIN mark descriptive of
Centocor’s services, the TTAB explained that the mere fact that
Centocor was the first and only user of the specific combination
PROGRAMMED PROTEIN “did not support registration if the only
72
significance conveyed by the phrase is merely descriptive.”
The

65. Id.
66. Id. at *3.
67. Id. (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary,
webster.com/dictionary/protein (last visited Jan. 31, 2009)).
68. Id. at *4.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id.

http://www.merriam-
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TTAB also rejected Centocor’s argument that because the
PROGRAMMED PROTEIN mark did not create one single,
immediately understood meaning of the mark, it was not merely
73
descriptive. The TTAB explained that it must look at the mark as
used in connection with Centocor’s identified medical services
74
relating to DNA and gene synthesis. The TTAB held that “[t]he fact
that a term may have meanings other than the one relevant to the
75
services in issue here is not controlling.” In this case, the TTAB
concluded that it was sufficient that a purpose or feature of
76
Centocor’s services was included within the meaning of the term.
In sum, considering PROGRAMMED PROTEIN as a whole, the
TTAB found that the evidence of record established a prima facie
case that the mark was descriptive, and that the mark “immediately
describe[d] . . . a significant feature or function of [Centocor’s]
77
services, namely the provision of programmed proteins.”
Accordingly, the TTAB affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to
78
register the mark under section 2(e)(1), and, in turn, the Federal
79
Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision.
C. Priority of Use
First Niagara Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Financial
80
Group, Inc.
In First Niagara, the Federal Circuit affirmed, without opinion, the
TTAB’s decision dismissing certain opposition proceedings and
sustaining others filed by First National Insurance Brokers, Inc. (“FNCanada”) against First Niagara Financial Group, Inc. (“FN-US”) based
on FN-US’s applications to register several marks incorporating
81
FIRST NATIONAL for insurance, leasing, and banking services.
The Federal Circuit had reversed an earlier TTAB decision in this
case on the ground that the “use” required to challenge an
application for registration on the grounds of priority and likelihood
1.

73. Id. at *5.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *6.
78. Id. at *7.
79. In re Centocor, Inc., 267 F. App’x 931, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g
No. 78448489, 2006 WL 3540106, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2006).
80. First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc. (Niagara II),
294 F. App’x 609 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g Nos. 91122072, 91122224,
91122193, 91122450, 91122712, 911502371 (T.T.A.B. June 6, 2007).
81. Id. at 610.
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of confusion was merely “use in the United States,” not “use in
82
commerce.” Because the TTAB had mistakenly applied the higher
standard of “use in commerce,” the Federal Circuit remanded the
83
case to the TTAB.
FN-US, a U.S.-based insurance brokerage firm, filed intent-to-use
applications for a number of marks encompassing the term FIRST
NIAGARA for various leasing, banking, insurance, and financial
84
services. FN-Canada, a Canada-based insurance broker, opposed
each of FN-US’s applications on the basis that FN-US’s marks were
likely to cause confusion with FN-Canada’s prior unregistered (i.e.,
common law) marks, including the marks FIRST NIAGARA and
FIRST NIAGARA INSURANCE BROKERS for insurance and
85
financial services.
FN-Canada did not have any offices, employees, or assets in the
United States, and it was not licensed to act as an insurance broker in
86
the United States. It did, however, sell insurance policies issued by
United States-based underwriting companies, and it sold policies to
United States citizens with Canadian property through insurance
87
Additionally, FN-Canada used its
brokers in the United States.
FIRST NIAGARA marks in advertising that spilled over into the
United States and in correspondence to customers in the United
88
States.
When the TTAB first heard this case on October 21, 2005, FN-US
argued that FN-Canada could not establish the priority needed to
prevail on a likelihood-of-confusion claim because it had not used its
89
marks “in commerce” in the United States under 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
The TTAB agreed, finding that any connections FN-Canada had with
the United States were de minimis and “merely incidental to FN90
Canada’s rendering of its insurance brokerage services in Canada.”
The TTAB further held that FN-Canada’s activities did not constitute

82. First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc. (Niagara I),
476 F.3d 867, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’g Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193,
91122450, 91122712, 91150237, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1334 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2005).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 868–69.
85. Id. at 869.
86. Id. at 868.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 869.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 869–70 (quoting First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin.
Group, Inc. (Niagara TTAB Decision I), Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193,
91122450, 91122712, 91150237, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1334, 1344 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2005)).

958

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:947

rendering of insurance brokerage services in either interstate or
91
foreign commerce.
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the TTAB erroneously
framed the issue as “use in commerce” regulated by Congress, as
92
opposed to “use in the United States.” The court held that such an
assumption was unwarranted due to the plain language of the statute,
which requires only that the prior mark be “used in the United States
93
by another.” According to the Federal Circuit, the privilege to claim
priority under section 2(d), based only on intrastate use of a mark,
“attaches to all opposers, regardless of whether they are foreign or
94
domestic.”
Accordingly, a foreign opposer like FN-Canada is
entitled to oppose a mark merely by demonstrating use of its mark in
95
the United States. Applying this test, the Federal Circuit held that
the TTAB erroneously dismissed FN-Canada’s oppositions as the
record revealed “more than ample” use of FN-Canada’s marks in the
United States to satisfy the use requirements of section 2(d). The
Federal Circuit remanded the case to the TTAB for further
96
proceedings consistent with its opinion.
On remand, based on the Federal Circuit’s decision, the TTAB
found that FN-Canada had established priority of use for each of its
pleaded FIRST NIAGARA marks used in connection with insurance
97
The TTAB then turned to the issue of likelihood of
services.
98
confusion, applying the following DuPont factors: (1) similarity of
the marks, (2) similarity of the services, (3) actual confusion,
(4) intent, (5) trade channels, (6) classes of purchasers, and
99
(7) conditions under which purchases are made.
Regarding the
similarity of the marks, the TTAB found that FIRST NIAGARA was
the dominant portion of each of the parties’ marks, that each of the
parties’ marks began with the term FIRST NIAGARA, and that the
other wording in each of the parties’ marks was merely descriptive, if
100
not generic, and had been disclaimed.
Based on these and other
91. Id. at 870 (quoting Niagara TTAB Decision I, Nos. 91122072, 91122224,
91122193, 91122450, 91122712, 91150237,,77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1344).
92. Id. at 871.
93. Id. at 870 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006)).
94. Id. at 871.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc. (Niagara
TTAB Decision II), Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193, 91122450, 91122712,
911502371, slip op. at 9–10 (T.T.A.B. June 6, 2007), aff’d, 294 F. App’x 609 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
98. See supra note 23 (listing the DuPont factors).
99. Niagara TTAB Decision II, slip op. at 11–28.
100. Id. at 12–13.
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facts, the TTAB found that the similarities of the parties’ marks
101
weighed strongly in FN-Canada’s favor.
Regarding the parties’ services, the TTAB first considered the three
applications owned by FN-Canada covering services in Class 36 and
102
various leasing services in other classes.
Finding that the parties’
insurance-related services were identical, the TTAB concluded that
the similarity-of-goods factor weighed strongly in FN-Canada’s favor
103
in relation to the insurance services covered by these applications.
However, the TTAB also found that there was no evidence of record
that FN-Canada offered the leasing services covered by those three
applications or that the leasing services were sufficiently related to its
104
insurance services to cause a likelihood of confusion. Accordingly,
the TTAB held that the similarity-of-goods factor weighed in favor of
FN-US for the leasing and related services in Classes 35, 37, and 39 in
105
those three applications.
Turning to the remaining three applications, which covered only
banking services in Class 36, the TTAB rejected FN-Canada’s
argument that such services were related to its insurance services,
finding that there was insufficient evidence of record to establish a
connection between FN-Canada’s insurance services and either FN106
US’s retail banking services or its electronic banking services.
Accordingly, the TTAB found that the similarity-of-goods factor
107
weighed in FN-US’s favor for banking services.
FN-Canada contended that the record contained significant
evidence of actual confusion noting that from July 2000 to July 2002
108
FN-Canada received 2600 emails intended for FN-US.
FN-US
admitted that its clients had mistakenly sent emails to FN-Canada.
However, FN-US argued that the misdirected emails were the result
of similarities in the parties’ email addresses, as opposed to any
109
The
confusion as to the source of the parties’ insurance services.
TTAB held that, because the parties were relatively small local
businesses, the number of misdirected emails was significant. This
problem, however, had occurred during a two-year period
commencing shortly after FN-Canada implemented its new email
101. Id. at 16.
102. Id. at 17–18.
103. Id. at 18.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 18–23.
107. Id. at 23.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 23–24 (noting that FN-Canada’s domain
“firstniagara.com” and FN-US’s domain name was “first-niagara.com”).

name
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system using the “firstniagara.com” domain name, and thus at least
110
some of the errors were likely the result of a typing error. Further,
the TTAB found that the likelihood of more than initial-interest
confusion was extremely limited because FN-Canada was not licensed
to provide insurance services in the United States and FN-US was not
111
Accordingly,
licensed to provide insurance services in Canada.
although the TTAB found that the actual confusion shown in the
record favored FN-Canada, the mitigating factors involved made this
112
factor of little probative value.
As to intent, FN-Canada argued that the similarities in the marks
and the geographic proximity of the parties’ businesses to each other
113
established FN-US intended to trade on FN-Canada’s goodwill.
However, the TTAB found that there was no evidence of such intent,
and it refused to infer such intent “from the mere facts of both
businesses using marks strongly suggestive of their respective
114
geographic locations.”
Finally, the TTAB presumed that the insurance services offered by
115
the parties were rendered through the same channels of trade.
However, with respect to FN-US’s banking and leasing services, there
was no evidence in the record of the channels of trade, and thus the
116
As to the classes of
TTAB drew no conclusions in this regard.
customers, the TTAB found that there was no evidence in the record
that the relevant public was more limited than the general public,
117
and thus this factor weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
However, because the TTAB found that insurance, leasing, and
banking services were likely to involve some degree of care due to
their relative expense, the care likely used in purchasing such services
118
mitigated against a likelihood of confusion.
Based on the analysis above, the TTAB concluded that because of
the substantial similarities between the commercial impressions of
the parties’ FIRST NIAGARA marks, their concurrent use of the
identical marks on the identical insurance services in the same trade
channels and to the same classes of purchasers, a likelihood of
119
confusion existed as to insurance services. On the other hand, the
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
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TTAB also concluded that despite the substantial similarities in the
commercial impressions of the parties’ marks, FN-Canada had not
established that its insurance services were sufficiently related to FNUS’s leasing and/or banking services to create a likelihood of
120
confusion as to those particular services. Thus, the TTAB sustained
FN-Canada’s oppositions to the three applications covering insurance
and leasing services as to the services in Class 36 (i.e., the insurance
services), but dismissed the oppositions as to the remaining
121
services. Further, the TTAB dismissed the oppositions to the three
122
applications covering only banking services.
The Federal Circuit
123
affirmed the TTAB’s decision in its entirety.
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
124

Sakar International, Inc. v. United States
In Sakar International, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the decision
of the United States Court of International Trade, which had held
that it had jurisdiction over Sakar International, Inc.’s (“Sakar”)
challenge to a fine imposed by the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (“Customs”) for importing counterfeit products into the
125
The Federal Circuit determined that Sakar’s
United States.
challenge did not fall within the limited jurisdiction of the Court of
126
International Trade.
In 2002, Sakar attempted to import into the United States 500
personal digital assistant (“PDA”) travel chargers and 2311 PDA mini127
keyboards that had been manufactured in China.
Customs
determined that the goods were counterfeit because the travel
chargers bore the “UL” trademark registered to Underwriters
Laboratories and the mini-keyboards displayed the “Flying Window”
128
Customs seized the goods
trademark of Microsoft Corporation.
1.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 30.
122. Id.
123. Niagara II, 294 F. App’x 609, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g Nos.
91122072, 91122224, 91122193, 91122450, 91122712, 911502371 (T.T.A.B. June 6,
2007).
124. 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev’g 466 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008).
125. Id. at 1341–42.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1342.
128. Id.
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pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
129
§ 1526(e), which provided that “any . . . merchandise bearing a
counterfeit mark . . . imported into the United States . . . shall be
seized and, in the absence of the written consent of the trademark
130
owner, forfeited for violations of the customs laws.”
In a letter,
Customs notified Sakar of the seizure and informed Sakar that the
goods would be forfeited and disposed of, unless the trademark
131
owners consented in writing to the importation within thirty days.
The goods were destroyed because Customs did not receive the
132
requisite consents.
Customs used its discretion under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(f) to fine Sakar
$381,500, a fine that was double the amount Customs evaluated to be
133
the goods’ manufacturer’s suggested retail price (“MSRP”).
Responding to a petition by Sakar, Customs reduced the fine by fifty
percent to $190,750, and later further reduced the fine to $67,775
134
Customs notified Sakar of
based on a recalculation of the MSRP.
this reduction in a letter, which stated that “the letter constituted the
‘final administrative review’ available to Sakar” and that Customs
135
would accept no further petitions.
Sakar filed suit in the Court of International Trade, alleging in its
complaint that Customs had acted contrary to law in its calculation of
the MSRP of the seized goods and in its conclusion that the goods
136
were counterfeit.
Sakar’s complaint alleged that jurisdiction was
137
proper based on several provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1581. The court
found proper jurisdiction only under § 1581(i)(4) as it relates to
138
§ 1581(i)(3). As the court noted, § 1581(i)(3) provided in relevant
part:
[T]he Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United
States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the
United States providing for . . . (3) embargoes or other quantitative
restrictions on the importation of merchandise for reasons other
than the protection of the public health or safety; or (4)
129. Id.
130. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006).
131. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1342.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1342–43.
135. Id. at 1343.
136. Id. (citing Sakar Int’l, Inc. v. United States (Sakar USCIT Decision), 466 F.
Supp. 2d 1333, 1336–37 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006), rev’d, 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008)).
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Sakar USCIT Decision, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1337–46).

2009]

2008 TRADEMARK DECISIONS

963

administration and enforcement with respect to the matters
139
referred to in paragraphs (1)–(3) of this subsection . . . .

The Court of International Trade determined that Custom’s
seizure of Sakar’s goods amounted to an “embargo” within the
140
meaning of § 1581(i)(3) and thus held that jurisdiction was proper.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s
141
as it related to the
holding in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
142
jurisdictional question at issue. The Federal Circuit noted that, in
that case, the Supreme Court held that the word ‘embargo’ should be
interpreted based upon its ordinary meaning, which is “a
governmentally imposed [quantitative] restriction—of zero—on the
143
The Federal Circuit further noted
importation of merchandise.”
the Supreme Court’s explanation that
[a]n importation prohibition is not an embargo if rather than
reflecting a governmental restriction on the quantity of a particular
product that will enter, it merely provides a mechanism by which a
private party might, at its own option, enlist the Government’s aid
in restricting the quantity of imports in order to enforce a private
144
right.

Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s
reasoning that 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)—the statute at issue in that case—
is very different from an embargo because “[t]he trademark owner
has the sole authority to decide that all products bearing its
trademark will enter or that none will, and to decide what entity may
145
import them, under what conditions, and for what purpose.”
In Sakar, the government argued that the holding in K Mart
regarding 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) applied with equal force to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526(e) because a seizure of goods under § 1526(e) is not an

139. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (2000)).
140. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1343. The Court of International Trade also
considered whether, under court Rule 12(b)(5), Sakar International’s complaint
stated a claim on which relief could be granted. Id. at 1343–44; see also CT. INT’L
TRADE R. 12(b)(5) (permitting a party to assert by motion the defense of “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). Because the Federal Circuit did
not reach this issue on appeal, however, we do not address it in this Article.
141. 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
142. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1345.
143. Id. (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. at 185).
144. Id. (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. at 185).
145. Id. (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. at 186); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006)
(“[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign
manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or
receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation . . .
organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office . . . unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the
time of making entry.”).
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embargo because it is not a governmentally imposed quantitative
146
restriction on the importation of merchandise. In response, Sakar
argued that § 1526(e) completely bans the importation of counterfeit
147
goods and thus was, in fact, an embargo.
The Federal Circuit sided with the government because, under
§ 1526(e), the trademark owner possesses the ultimate control over
148
whether counterfeit merchandise is imported.
Specifically, the
court explained that § 1526(e) sets forth a two-step process in which
(1) Customs seizes illegally imported counterfeit merchandise, and
(2) Customs forfeits that merchandise, unless the trademark owner
149
Thus, because the counterfeit
consents to the importation.
merchandise may enter the United States with the consent of the
trademark owner, the court found that § 1526(e) does not constitute
150
an embargo under K Mart.
As such, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of International
Trade lacked jurisdiction over Sakar’s suit and vacated and remanded
the decision with the instruction that the Court of International
151
Trade dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
152

Siler v. United States
In Siler, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United
States Court of Federal Claims, finding, among other things, that the
Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear trademark
153
disputes.
Stanley R. Siler had filed an action in the Court of Federal Claims
alleging that the United States, through the U.S. courts, had
“damaged” his copyright and trademark (1) “by breach of duty,
breach of trust, with fraudulent intent, done through negligence,”
and (2) “by engaging in unfair trade practices and unfair
154
More precisely, Siler claimed that, in prior legal
competition.”
actions, “various state and federal courts did not rule on his motions,
did not give him an opportunity to appear and/or be heard, and that

2.

146. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1345.
147. Id. at 1345–46.
148. Id. at 1347 (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1348.
151. Id. at 1350.
152. Siler v. United States, No. 2008-5054, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724 (Fed. Cir.
Oct. 8, 2008) (per curiam), aff’g No. 08-099C, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 337 (Fed. Cl.
Mar. 6, 2008).
153. Id. at *1.
154. Id.
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In
the government seized his property and had him arrested.”
response to Siler’s claims, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the
156
complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.
Additionally, the Court of Federal Claims determined that any
allegations that the government had infringed Siler’s copyright or
157
trademark under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) failed to state a claim upon
158
which relief could be granted.
As a result, the complaint was
subject to dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) of the Civil Rules of Federal
159
Procedure.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal
160
Claims’ dismissal of Siler’s complaint was proper. First, the Federal
Circuit found that Siler’s allegations about the actions and rulings of
various courts were not within the jurisdictional grant of §
161
1491(a)(1). In short, the Court of Federal Claims had no authority
to review the decisions of the courts in which Siler had previously
162
filed complaints.
Rather, Siler should have sought review of the
other courts’ decisions through the appellate process of each such
163
court. Second, the Federal Circuit found that the lower court did
not err by noting that a trademark infringement claim was subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
164
This was because no statute grants the Court of Federal
granted.
165
Claims jurisdiction over trademark claims.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal
166
Claims to dismiss the action.

155. Id. at *1–2.
156. Id. at *2; see Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006) (granting jurisdiction
to the Court of Federal Claims to render judgment upon various claims against the
United States).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (2006) (“[W]henever the copyright in any work
protected under the copyright laws of the United States shall be infringed by the
United States . . . the exclusive action which may be brought for such infringement
shall be an action by the copyright owner against the United States in the Court of
Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as
damages for such infringement . . . .”).
158. Siler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *2.
159. Id.; see also CT. FED. CL. R. 12(b)(6) (listing “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted” as a valid defense by motion). Due to the limited scope
of this Article, the copyright-related holding of this case is not discussed.
160. Siler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *2.
161. Id. at *3.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *4.
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B. Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Standing
167

Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp.
In Nasalok, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s summary
judgment grant in favor of Nylok Corp. (“Nylok”) and held that
Nasalok Coating Corp.’s (“Nasalok”) claims were barred by res
168
judicata (claim preclusion).
Both parties manufactured “self-locking fasteners using nylon
169
locking elements.” Nasalok, a Korean corporation, sold products to
170
multiple U.S.-based companies.
Nylok, a U.S. corporation, owned
federal trademark Registration No. 2,398,840 (“the ‘840
Registration”) for “a patch of the color blue on a selected number of
threads of an externally threaded fastener, with the blue patch
extending more than 90 degrees and less than 360 degrees around
171
The designated use for the
the circumference of the fastener.”
172
mark was on “metal externally threaded fasteners.”
The design
mark appears below:

1.

Initially, Nylok filed a complaint against Nasalok in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and alleged
infringement of several trademarks, one of which was the ‘840
173
Due to Nasalok’s failure to enter an appearance in
Registration.
district court, the district court entered a default judgment and an
injunction against Nasalok that prohibited the company from selling,
importing, and promoting or advertising any self-locking fastener
with a nylon locking element having the color blue or any confusingly

167. Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., 522 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’g
No. 92045050, 2007 WL 1022715 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2007).
168. Id. at 1330.
169. Id. at 1322.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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174

similar color. The order also stated that Nylok was the owner of the
175
‘840 Registration and that the trademark was valid and enforceable.
176
Nasalok did not appeal that order.
177
After five months passed, Nasalok petitioned the TTAB, alleging
that
the [‘840 Registration] [was] invalid because it [was] functional, a
phantom mark, descriptive, generic, not distinctive, and
ornamental; that Nylok’s use ha[d] not been substantially
exclusive; and that Nylok fraudulently obtained the ’840
Registration by stating in its amended application that the mark
had become distinctive of [its] goods through substantially
exclusive and continuous use in interstate commerce for five
178
years.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Nylok argued that
res judicata barred Nasalok from claiming that the ‘840 Registration
was invalid because Nasalok had not asserted an invalidity claim in
179
The TTAB granted Nylok’s
the earlier infringement action.
motion, holding that res judicata barred Nasalok’s petition to cancel
because (1) the infringement action and the petition involved the
same parties, (2) a final judgment on the merits had been made on
the infringement action, and (3) the cancellation petition arose out
180
of the same transactional facts as those present in the civil action.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first determined that Nasalok’s
claim of trademark invalidity was not a compulsory counterclaim in
the trademark infringement action in the district court. The court
reasoned that the subject matter of Nylok’s infringement claim in the
first action and the subject matter of Nasalok’s invalidity claim in the
second action did not arise out of the same “transaction or
181
occurrence.” Specifically, the “essential facts” that Nylok alleged in
its infringement action—its ownership of the mark and Nasalok’s
alleged infringement—did not form the basis of Nasalok’s
182
In addition, the Federal Circuit cited various
cancellation claim.
policy reasons for the position that invalidity defenses should not be
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.; Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp. (Nasalok TTAB Decision), No.
92045050, 2007 WL 1022715, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2007), aff’d, 522 F.3d 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
178. Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d at 1322.
179. Id. at 1322–23.
180. Id. at 1323 (citing Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (establishing a three-part test for claim preclusion)).
181. Id. at 1325–26 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A)).
182. Id. at 1326.
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183

For example, the Federal
treated as compulsory counterclaims.
Circuit noted that it may be “difficult to anticipate . . . new products
and future disputes that may later arise between . . . two parties . . . .
[so] a defendant in [a] first infringement suit should not be
precluded from raising invalidity of the mark in the second action
simply because it was not raised as a counterclaim in the first
184
The court noted further that “treating challenges to
action.”
trademark validity as compulsory counterclaims to infringement
actions would violate the well-established policy of freely allowing
challenges to the validity of claimed intellectual property
185
protection.” In holding that a claim for cancellation of a trademark
registration was not a compulsory counterclaim for a party defending
against an infringement action in district court, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged its departure from TTAB precedent and procedure,
which provides that such a counterclaim is compulsory in TTAB
186
proceedings under the same circumstances.
Second, the Federal Circuit determined that the later action
187
The court
collaterally attacked the judgment of the first action.
observed that allowing Nasalok to challenge the validity of the ‘840
Registration, which granted Nylok the rights to use “a patch of color
blue on a selected number of threads of an externally threaded
fastener,” would effectively undo the district court’s injunction order
188
in the infringement action. Claim preclusion was thus necessary to
189
The court rejected Nasalok’s
protect the earlier judgment.
argument that preclusion should not apply to an injunction resulting
from a default judgment, stating that “[i]t is well established that ‘[a]
default judgment can operate as res judicata in appropriate
190
circumstances.’” Because the trademark invalidity claim constituted
a collateral attack on the district court’s judgment in the earlier suit,
the Federal Circuit held that res judicata barred Nasalok’s claim and
191
affirmed the TTAB’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Nylok.
183. Id. at 1327.
184. Id.
185. Id.; see also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (repudiating the
rule of patent licensee estoppel, under which a licensee is prohibited from
challenging the validity of the patent that is the basis for the license because of “the
strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain”).
186. Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d at 1325 n.3; see also supra note 14 (discussing
TTAB rules regarding compulsory counterclaims).
187. Id. at 1328–29.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1329.
190. Id. (quoting Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha v. Thinksharp, 448 F.3d 1368, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
191. Id. at 1330.
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Circuit Judge Newman concurred in the judgment, stating that
while she agreed with the majority’s affirmation of the TTAB’s
judgment, she would do so because “Nasalok’s claim for cancellation
[was] precluded by the judgment against Nasalok” in the district
192
She asserted that the question of whether Nasalok’s
court.
trademark invalidity claim was a compulsory counterclaim was
193
irrelevant because “the TTAB recognized [that] the cancellation
proceeding raise[d] the same grounds of invalidity that were before
194
the district court.” Thus, Judge Newman reasoned that the validity
195
of the mark “was decided and was not appealed.”
Judge Newman
contended that the majority’s thorough discussion of compulsory
counterclaims was irrelevant and that precedent did not broadly
authorize relitigation in the PTO issues that were decided finally in
196
Judge Newman also
the district court between the same parties.
criticized the majority opinion’s reliance on patent public policy,
explaining that patent and trademark public policy did not share the
197
same objectives.
In sum, Judge Newman agreed that Nasalok’s
petition to cancel should be dismissed, but determined that it should
198
be dismissed on the ground of basic claim preclusion.
199

Farah v. Pramil S.R.L.
In Farah, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s cancellation of
Michel Farah’s trademark registration based on Pramil S.R.L.’s
200
(“Pramil”) prior registration for the same mark.
It also rejected
Farah’s arguments that Pramil lacked standing, that it was collaterally
estopped from asserting the grounds for cancellation, and that it
failed to carry its burden of proof for priority of use and continuous
201
use of the mark during the cancellation proceeding.
Farah applied to register, in connection with certain cosmetics, the
202
Pramil petitioned to cancel the registration,
mark OMIC PLUS.
alleging priority of use for the mark OMIC for cosmetics and that a
likelihood of confusion existed between the OMIC mark and Farah’s
2.

192. Id. (Newman, C.J., concurring).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1331.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Farah v. Pramil S.R.L., No. 2008-1329, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184 (Fed. Cir.
Nov. 24, 2008) (per curiam).
200. Id. at *1.
201. Id. at *4–11.
202. Id. at *1.
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203

While the TTAB case was pending, Farah’s
OMIC PLUS mark.
exclusive licensee— Gapardis Health and Beauty, Inc. (“Gapardis”)—
filed an infringement action against Pramil and Pramil’s U.S.
distributor in the United States District Court for the Southern
204
District of Florida. Pramil did not respond to the complaint, and a
default judgment was entered for Gapardis, permanently enjoining
205
Pramil from using the mark OMIC PLUS.
Farah moved for
summary judgment before the TTAB, alleging that the district court’s
injunction had eliminated Pramil’s standing and that Pramil was
206
collaterally estopped from asserting the grounds for cancellation.
The TTAB denied Farah’s motion, and, after finding that Pramil had
established priority of use and likelihood of confusion, subsequently
207
Farah appealed,
granted the cancellation of Farah’s registration.
arguing (1) that the district court’s judgment barred Pramil from
maintaining its cancellation petition because it lacked standing after
the permanent injunction and (2) the district court’s default
judgment collaterally estopped Pramil from asserting the cancellation
208
Additionally, Farah argued that Pramil failed to meet its
claim.
burden of proof in its cancellation proceeding for both priority of
209
use and continuous use of its mark.
The Federal Circuit first rejected Farah’s argument that Pramil
lacked standing in the cancellation proceeding after the district
210
court’s judgment.
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1064, a petition to cancel a
registration of a mark may be filed “by any person who believes that
211
he is or will be damaged . . . by the registration of a mark.” Under
this standard, Pramil needed only to demonstrate a “real interest” in
212
the proceedings and a reasonable basis for the belief of damage.
When the TTAB applied this standard, it found that Pramil’s use of
the OMIC mark for cosmetics was sufficient to establish a direct

203. Id. at *2.
204. Id. at *2–3.
205. Id. at *3.
206. Id.
207. Id. (citing Farah v. Pramil S.R.L. (Farah TTAB Decision), No. 92032341, 2008
WL 853844 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2008)).
208. Id. at *4.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2006).
212. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *5; see also Ritchie v. Simpson, 170
F.3d 1092, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that an opposer must meet these two
judicially created requirements to establish standing under the Lanham Act); Int’l
Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(noting that there is no requirement that damage be proved for an opposer to
establish standing).
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commercial interest in the mark; thus, Pramil had standing to
213
The
petition to cancel Farah’s OMIC PLUS mark for cosmetics.
TTAB also noted that the district court’s injunction did not prohibit
Pramil from using its OMIC mark; rather, the injunction simply
ordered Pramil not to use the OMIC PLUS mark or any
214
The Federal
reproduction, copy, or colorable imitation thereof.
Circuit found no error in the TTAB’s conclusion regarding Pramil’s
215
standing to file the cancellation petition.
On the issue of collateral estoppel, the Federal Circuit explained
that collateral estoppel precludes “the relitigation of issues only when
those issues were ‘actually litigated’ in a prior lawsuit,” but the
underlying issues cannot be litigated when a default judgment is
216
issued. Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s finding that
the district court’s default judgment did not collaterally estop Pramil
217
from pursuing the cancellation proceeding.
The court also dismissed Farah’s argument that Pramil failed to
carry its burden of proof for the priority-of-use element of its petition
to cancel because Farah did not establish that Pramil applied its mark
218
to the goods themselves or that the goods were sold to the public.
219
Under section 45 of the Lanham Act, the term “use in commerce”
means “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of
220
trade.” The Federal Circuit explained,
[A] mark is “use[d] in commerce,” when: (1) “it is placed in any
manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of
the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on
documents associated with the goods or their sale,” and (2) “the
221
goods are sold or transported in commerce.”

Thus, the court noted, under the statute, Pramil need not make a
showing of either (1) an application of the mark to the goods
222
themselves or (2) that the goods were sold to the public.
The
213. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *5.
214. Id. at *5–6.
215. Id. at *6.
216. Id. at *7; see Lee ex rel. Lee v. United States, 124 F.3d 1291, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (explaining that, when a judgment is issued in a case as the result of a default,
that judgment cannot serve to preclude further litigation of the issues of that case
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because those underlying issues have not
yet been litigated).
217. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *7–8.
218. Id. at *8–9.
219. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
220. Id.
221. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *8–9 (quoting § 1127).
222. Id. at *8.
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TTAB found that Pramil’s prior use was established by proof that
6000 units of [its] OMIC product were sold in 1994 to a company in
223
During the TTAB proceeding, Pramil’s witness testified
Florida.
224
that “OMIC” was marked on these products.
In addition, the
invoice for that sale identified the products with the OMIC mark and
225
the current product packaging clearly displayed the mark. Because
Farah did not provide any evidence to the contrary in support of its
argument, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision
226
regarding Pramil’s priority of use.
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Farah’s allegation that Pramil
227
had not proven its continuous use of the mark. Farah asserted that
Pramil’s evidence showed use of the mark only from 1994 to 1996
and from 2000 to 2004, and that, because of an unexplained fouryear gap, Pramil failed to carry its burden of establishing continuous
228
use of its mark. The TTAB stated that abandonment is a defense to
evidence of prior use so Farah bore the burden to prove
229
abandonment.
The TTAB found that Pramil’s witness explained
gap and “testified that Pramil’s use of the mark ha[d] been
230
continuous since 1994, with no interruption.”
Farah offered no
contrary evidence; the TTAB consequently held that Farah failed to
231
prove an abandonment defense. The Federal Circuit affirmed this
holding and also rejected Farah’s argument that the witness
testimony was not enough to prove Pramil’s continuous use of the
232
mark. The Federal Circuit thus denied Farah’s appeal and affirmed
the TTAB’s decision to cancel Farah’s application to register his
233
mark.
CONCLUSION
With respect to trademark decisions, the Federal Circuit was
relatively quiet in 2008. The court chose to issue only one
234
precedential decision, and three of the four decisions by the court
223. Id. at *9 (citing Farah TTAB Decision, 2008 WL 853844, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 29,
2008)).
224. Id.
225. Id. (citing Farah TTAB Decision, 2008 WL 853844, at *3).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *9–10.
229. Id. at *10 (quoting Farah TTAB Decision, 2008 WL 853844, at *4).
230. Id. (citing Farah TTAB Decision, 2008 WL 853844, at *4).
231. Id. (citing Farah TTAB Decision, 2008 WL 853844, at *4).
232. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *10–11.
233. Id. at *11.
234. Sakar Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 488 (2008).
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235

on substantive trademark issues were issued without opinion.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit’s analyses of the lower tribunal’s
decisions in these cases—especially its disagreement with and
clarification of certain issues in the lower tribunals’ decisions—
should be of interest to practitioners. Of particular importance are
the court’s finding in Nasalok that counterclaims for cancellation of a
trademark registration are not compulsory in cases where
236
infringement has been asserted, and the court’s reversal in Sakar
International, Inc., of the Court of International Trade’s decision
asserting jurisdiction over challenges to fines issued in connection
237
with the seizure of counterfeit goods.

235. First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 294 F. App’x
609 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193,
91122450, 91122712, 911502371 (T.T.A.B. June 6, 2007); In re Marisol, LLC, 281 F.
App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam); In re Centocor, Inc., 267 F. App’x 931 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
236. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s affirmation of the
decision of the TTAB).
237. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the decision
of the Court of International Trade).

